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The complementarity between one model of large-scale
agribusiness and another of small-scale family farming is a
common narrative reproduced by the Brazilian government
(Presideˆncia da Repu´blica, 2006, 2011), and one that is
reﬂected in Brazil’s development cooperation in Africa
(ABC, 2010). For example, the ProSAVANA program in
Mozambique draws mainly on Brazil’s experience in large-
scale agribusiness development in the Cerrado, an area por-
trayed as similar to the African savannah (Shankland &
Gonc¸alves, 2016). Alongside ProSAVANA, the Brazilian gov-
ernment is implementing More Food International (MFI), a
cooperation program inspired by Brazil’s More Food Pro-
gram and that aims at strengthening the productive capacity
of smallholder farmers in African countries, who are claimed
to bear a resemblance to Brazil’s family farmers.
However, the complementarity argument is disputed and an
alternative view portrays Brazilian agriculture as a dualism in
which a hegemonic battle is fought out between the two para-
digms (Pierri, 2013). The social mobilization against ProSA-
VANA which called for a family farming alternative to the
program’s agribusiness thrust (Shankland, Gonc¸alves, &
Favareto, 2016) is such a battle. In the present paper we
engage with a less visible dispute—regarding the contested
meaning of family farming in Brazil—and analyze how this
dispute travels to African countries through the implementa-
tion of MFI.
As our analysis illustrates, policy constructs that emerge in
particular settings, such as Brazil’s family farming and the
dualism argument, do not travel easily across socio-political
realities. Yet, although following a universal development47formula has long been criticized (e.g., Cornwall & Brock,
2005), it remains standard practice. South–South cooperation
of the type Brazil claims to exercise (de Abreu, 2013) adds a
new rationale to the blueprint bias in development, in that it
claims aﬃnity across the so-called South—particularly
between Brazil and Africa—and is used to justify common
strategies (Scoones, Amanor, Favareto, & Gubo, 2016).
Indeed, the idea that ‘‘for every African problem there is a
Brazilian solution” has become a popular slogan of Brazilian
cooperation in Africa (Amorim, 2011).
Accordingly, the family farming model, along with the Cer-
rado–savannah parallel, has been uncritically incorporated into
Brazil’s agricultural cooperation framework, with the assump-
tion that the concept and associated policies will undergo
straightforward transplantation to the African context. How-
ever, the ways in which African countries have interpreted and
operationalized Brazil’s family farming and associated pro-
grams have not quite matched Brazil’s own experience.
Although this is hardly surprising, in the present article we set
out to elucidate why this should be the case by focusing on
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can countries—Ghana, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe—all
localities in which the program has been implemented.2. A DISCOURSE-ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE ON A
CROSS-NATIONAL POLICY DOMAIN
Taking MFI as a case study, our analysis centers on the pol-
itics of Brazil’s development cooperation; we deﬁne the latter
as a cross-national policy domain with two distinct spheres of
action: the sphere of the provider country, Brazil, and the
sphere of its target countries, which, in our case, is represented
by the three aforementioned African nations. We focus pri-
marily on the dynamics of the Brazilian side, whereby we seek
to explore the sociopolitical climate in which the family farm-
ing model and MFI program originated, and examine how
they travel to Africa and feedback to Brazil. Although the
impact of the program in Africa is beyond the scope of our
research, we consider the initial reception MFI and its inherent
family farming concept have had in the three countries, as this
helps in understanding the dynamics of the Brazilian side, not
least the reconﬁguration of one of the program’s components.
Conceptually, our starting point is the literature that
emphasizes the inﬂuence of domestic politics over interna-
tional relations (Gourevitch, 1978), and which has been
applied to the analysis of foreign aid (Lancaster, 2007). This
literature accentuates the role of domestic institutions, and
actors’ interests and ideas within the provider country in shap-
ing foreign policy. Therefore, in order to understand MFI in
Africa, we ﬁrst need to consider the domestic sociopolitical cli-
mate that generated the program in Brazil. In addition to
extending the literature that focuses on traditional aid into
the domain of the emerging development actor of Brazil, we
also complement the former by adopting a discourse-
analytical perspective on the cooperation policy process.
The focus on discourse or ‘‘meaning-making” processes is
widely present in the study of policy-making (Fairclough,
1992; Hajer, 2005; Roe, 1994; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith,
1993; Shapiro, 1981; Torﬁng & Howarth, 2005) and in the
study of development policy narratives speciﬁcally (Roe,
1991). As noted by Fischer (2003), public policy is a discursive
construct, and ‘‘at the level of everyday interaction, discourses
represent speciﬁc systems of power and the social practices
that produce and reproduce them” (Fischer, 2003, 73). On this
basis, the perspective adopted by our research can be situated
within the family of discourse-analytical approaches con-
cerned with the broad manifestation of discourse as a political
struggle for the meaning of social phenomena—thus, diﬀering
from those that adopt a micro focus on the use of language
and linguistic repertoires in spoken or written text, such as
conversational or content analysis. 1
Indeed, in its broadest sense, social meaning is understood
to be partly or temporarily ﬁxed through discourse (Torﬁng,
2005). The analysis of discourse in policy-making is connected
with the analysis of politics and power struggles, which, in
turn, draws on the French philosopher Michel Foucault’s
notion that discourse and power are mutually constitutive—
that is, policy actors use discourse to exercise power but they
are themselves constituted by the discourse they reproduce
(Torﬁng, 2005). Within this tradition, Hajer (1997) deﬁnes dis-
course as ‘‘an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations
that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particu-
lar set of practices and through which meaning is given to
physical and social realities” (Hajer (1997, 44)); and ‘‘storyli-
nes” as the narratives on social reality that provide actors witha set of symbolic references that suggest a common under-
standing or the achievement of discursive closure (Hajer
(1997, 62)).
Drawing on these deﬁnitions, in this paper we use the term
‘‘discourse” to signify a higher-level theoretical concept that
concerns the meaning-making process, and ‘‘narrative” to rep-
resent the translation of such a discourse into storylines that
relate to concrete policy issues. However, while Hajer (1997)
is concerned with the visible, ‘‘argumentative battle” between
diﬀerent narrative storylines out in public spaces, we are inter-
ested in examining concealed discourse dynamics within a
shared family farming construct. These dynamics reﬂect
‘‘hegemonic struggles that aim to establish a political and
moral-intellectual leadership through the articulation of mean-
ing and identity” (Torﬁng, 2005, 15).
We start by considering narratives of family farming and
MFI in Brazil, and ﬁnd that the meaning of family farming
is not ﬁxed, but, rather, a ‘‘ﬂoating signiﬁer” (Torﬁng, 2005)
that is open to multiple interpretations. These not only repre-
sent an expression of diﬀerent agendas and understandings of
the agricultural sphere, but also operate as a tool for con-
structing and reinforcing such agendas and ideas. MFI repro-
duces the multiple meanings of family farming as reﬂected in
the distinctive narratives of the program, which we respec-
tively label ‘‘productivist modernization”, ‘‘territories of life”,
and ‘‘conservative modernization”.
We then consider how these Brazilian narratives travel to
Africa through the channel of cooperation, and explore the
extent to which Brazil’s domestic discourse gains new contours
when it reaches a diﬀerent continent. This approach connects
our analysis with research on the policy transfer process,
which is concerned with the transfer of policy content, instru-
ments, institutions, and ideas from one setting to another
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 2000; Evans, 2009; James &
Lodge, 2003). In our study, we provide an account of how
such transfer entails the navigation of discursive constructions
across diﬀerent contexts (Brazil and the three African coun-
tries) and, speciﬁcally, how narratives of MFI and family
farming in these contexts compare and why. With this focus,
our empirical evidence indicates that, for reasons around the
preferences of African governments and the prevalence of a
commercial agenda in Brazil’s cooperation framework, the
particular view that emphasizes mechanization-led agricul-
tural modernization dominates program practice. Yet, this
view is resisted by those both inside and outside government
who advocate for a ‘‘territories of life” perspective on family
farming, or one more akin to ‘‘agroecology” practices and
‘‘food sovereignty” goals.
Our analysis draws on research undertaken in Brazil,
Ghana, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe between November
2011 and February 2015. Fieldwork consisted mainly of qual-
itative interviews with individuals directly or indirectly con-
nected with the MFI program. In Brazil, interviewees were
selected from across government agencies, 2 rural social move-
ments, civil society organizations, and the agricultural machin-
ery industry. In Ghana, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe
respondents included a combination of Brazilian diplomats
and resident cooperation oﬃcials, and local government oﬃ-
cers. In Mozambique, civil society organizations that had
actively monitored Brazilian cooperation in the country were
also interviewed. The analysis also draws on the program’s
media coverage in the four countries, including MDA’s own
news releases, and the limited available documentation on
the program—industry brochures (Baldan, 2011), leaked list-
ings of requisitioned equipment (ABIMAQ, 2014) and, in
the case of Mozambique speciﬁcally, oﬃcial program
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Federativa do Brasil, 2013).
We employ these primary and secondary sources to identify
the narratives through which contrasting meanings of family
farming and MFI are constructed. Narratives of family farm-
ing and the Brazilian domestic More Food Program emerge
from our analysis of secondary literature and, on this basis,
our understanding of Brazil’s agrarian politics. Narratives of
MFI are drawn from interviews with key informants and pro-
gram documentation, and linked back to the other narratives.
Our aim is not to identify all possible interpretations (there are
certainly others not addressed in this paper), but to demon-
strate that there are contrasting understandings of family
farming and expectations around what MFI can achieve in
Africa. They suggest a more diverse contestation of interests
and perspectives than implied by the standard family
farming-versus-agribusiness dualism. These disputes are not
explicitly manifested in the public domain but are revealed
by our analysis of how actors involved in MFI discuss family
farming and the program.
Thus, moving beyond the aforementioned simplistic dualistic
representation helps in our understanding of Brazilian foreign
aid cooperation politics in all its complexity and the various
domestic forces at play. These, in turn, confront other agendas
and forces in Africa, as well as in the domain of international
organizations and networks. What is taken forward as agricul-
tural development is therefore a product of constant negotiation
and reinterpretation. However, before we make a detailed anal-
ysis of these meaning-making dynamics with regard to Brazil
(Section 4), and in the African context (Section 5), a fuller over-
view of the case study is required. Accordingly, the next section
addresses the genesis and set-up of the MFI program.3. INTRODUCING MORE FOOD INTERNATIONAL: A
NEW HYBRID OF BRAZILIAN COOPERATION
MFI is part of a wider portfolio of agricultural cooperation
programs the Brazilian government is sponsoring in Africa
(Cabral, Shankland, Favareto, & Costa Vaz, 2013). Until
recently, Brazil’s agricultural cooperation on the continent
was characterized by sporadic technical assistance involving
the delivery of short training courses and peer-to-peer sharing
of tropical agriculture science and technology—activities that
were conducted mainly by the Brazilian Agricultural Research
Corporation (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecua´ria:
EMBRAPA). Brazilian cooperation took on greater diversity
when an additional set of actors outside the agricultural
research domain joined the program, bringing a focus on pub-
lic policies and the practice of cooperation as a dialog around
public policy rather than just technical exchange based on
agronomic expertise.
The Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) in particu-
lar developed MFI as its main cooperation instrument. MFI
draws on Brazil’s domestic More Food Program, which oﬀers
subsidized credit to family farmers 3 in order to support mod-
ernization through the acquisition of agricultural machinery
and implements aimed at boosting productivity (Patriota &
Pierri, 2013). Such assistance is part of a policy package that
targets family farming under the framework of the National
Program for the Strengthening of Family Farming (Programa
Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar: PRO-
NAF), which has been in place for 20 years and remains the
main policy instrument for this group (MDA, 2010).
Drawing on this experience at home, MFI was established
as an export credit facility for developing countries in whicha concessional loan was tied to the purchase of agricultural
equipment manufactured in Brazil. The loan targets a group
of farmers equivalent to Brazil’s family farmers, which in
sub-Saharan Africa are expected to be small- to medium-
scale producers. In addition to hardware ﬁnancing, MFI
includes government-to-government exchange centered on
Brazil’s experience with public policy aimed at family farmers,
and speciﬁc activities designed to strengthen technical assis-
tance and rural extension systems in partner countries
(MDA, 2015b).
The program was launched in 2010 when African ministries
of agriculture gathered in Brası´lia for the Brazil–Africa Talks
on Food Safety, Hunger Alleviation, and Rural Development
(ABC, 2010). This was a buoyant time for Brazil, whose econ-
omy was thriving and its international proﬁle—which outgo-
ing President Lula da Silva had personally nurtured—was at
its highest (Dauvergne & Farias, 2012). Partnering with this
burgeoning country and farming giant was appealing to many
African countries as an alternative to traditional development
donors; and, for Brazil’s part, boosting relations with Africa
was an aspect of the broader geopolitical strategy of a trend
toward promoting South–South relations (Visentini, 2009).
It also helped garner support for Jose´ Graziano da Silva as
Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations (FAO), which was conﬁrmed in June
2011 with wholehearted support across the FAO’s African
membership.
The 2010 launch assembled delegations from more than 40
African countries who were introduced to a range of agricul-
tural public policies in Brazil (ABC, 2010). Among them was
More Food, which had been launched in Brazil at the time
of the food prices crisis in 2007–08 to boost food production
through improvement in family farm productivity (Patriota
& Pierri, 2013). The program also aimed to operationalize a
‘‘countercyclical industrial policy” through agricultural
machinery market expansion in a context of economic crisis
(Patriota & Pierri, 2013, 140). It was well received by the Afri-
can delegations and the image of tractors being shipped from
Brazil soon made headlines in Ghana and Zimbabwe (Ghana
News Agency, 2011; The Herald, 2011). In early 2011, the
Brazilian Chamber of Commerce (CAMEX) approved a con-
cessional loan of US$640 million to ﬁnance MFI in ﬁve Afri-
can countries (Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, and
Zimbabwe). Ghana, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe were subse-
quently allocated a sum of just under US$100 million each
(Patriota & Pierri, 2013, 142).
Zimbabwe received the ﬁrst MFI shipment four years after
the Brası´lia launch. The delayed start was mainly due to the
novelty of the program for the Brazilian authorities, which,
for the ﬁrst time, were obliged to confront a technical cooper-
ation project combined with a sales operation, meaning that a
new legal framework had to be created and operational mech-
anisms deﬁned (Cabral, 2015). Setting this up was not a mere
technical exercise but also a political process in which the
interests of a range of stakeholders had to be accommodated,
including those of politicians, and the bureaucracies of the
agricultural and foreign aﬀairs domains, as well as the business
sector.
In addition to the MDA as the lead institution in the pro-
gram’s design and implementation, other actors were involved,
including the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs (MRE), as the
patron of development cooperation; CAMEX, as the export
credit oversight agency; the Bank of Brazil as the lending insti-
tution; and various Brazilian industry representative bodies. 4
Further adding to the diversity of actors, within the MDA,
two separate departments were directly engaged in
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responsible for the overall conception of the program and
negotiation with partner countries (alongside the MRE); and
the Family Farming Secretariat, which implemented the hard-
ware component. The publication of a ministerial decree in
2013 detailing conditions for the sale of components
(Repu´blica Federativa do Brasil. Portaria MDA No 65 DE
05/08/, 2013) eventually cleared the way on Brazil’s side; it
was then up to partner countries to ﬁnalize operational
arrangements on their side and select the desired equipment
from the program’s menu of items. 5
In terms of the non-hardware component, MDA oﬃcials
claimed that policy dialog with partner governments had
taken place as part of short-term technical missions. However,
as discussed below, the extent to which the family farming
political message got across is thrown into doubt by the con-
centration of eﬀort on the delivery of hardware and reported
bias in the selection of equipment toward relatively sophisti-
cated items with questionable applicability for those (small-
to medium-scale) African farmers identiﬁed as the target
group (Amanor, 2013b).
Yet, criticism was not restricted to the issue of suitable tar-
geting. Brazil’s own version of the program had been accused
of prioritizing the interests of industry over those of family
farmers (Sa´, 2012). The following section reviews the debate
around family farming and its policies in Brazil in order to
illustrate that MFI exported with it domestic disputes, ambi-
guities, and, speciﬁcally, the multiple meanings attributed to
the concept of family farming. This will help in our under-
standing of how such a plurality of understandings was trans-
ferred to the African context, in which they were subject to
reinterpretation by local actors.4. BRAZIL’S NARRATIVES OF FAMILY FARMING
AND THE MORE FOOD PROGRAM
The view that Brazilian agriculture encompasses two social
forms of production—i.e., agribusiness and family farming—
has its origins in the 1990s, and is expressed in the governance
structure whereby two ministries oversee a single sector: the
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA)
promotes agribusiness, while the MDA supports family farm-
ers and agrarian reform (Pierri, 2013). Some commentators
contend that these two forms of production are complemen-
tary and central to Brazil’s agricultural success. Indeed, the
country possesses an entrepreneurial class that is highly pro-
ductive and makes a major contribution to exports, which
coexists with one that is labor intensive, relies on family enter-
prise, and fulﬁlls the social function of generating jobs and
food for the domestic market (MDA, 1999). However, this
view may be set against a contrasting argument that empha-
sizes conﬂict between the two production forms. This is the
contention articulated by rural civil society groups, not only
in Brazil but now also in Africa (Shankland & Gonc¸alves,
2016), which point to the social and environmental costs of
an agribusiness model focused on high levels of productivity
and corporate integration; and, therefore, campaign for a
change in priorities, and an increase in public resource alloca-
tions to agrarian reform projects and family-based farming
(Contag, 2014).
However, the line that separates agribusiness from family
farming is not ﬁxed but, we argue, subject to a socially con-
structed and shifting demarcation; and where the boundary
is drawn depends on how diﬀerent actors—both inside and
outside the state—exploit these discursive categories to articu-late their respective positions. Deconstructing the multiple
dimensions attributed to family farming vis-a`-vis agribusiness
is crucial, given that the purpose and meaning of such agricul-
tural programs when exported to Africa are contentious.
As discussed later in this section, the More Food Program is
justiﬁed in Brazil either as an instrument of modernization
that is utilized in the interests of production and productivity
increases, and can be adapted to small-scale agriculture, or as
a means of preserving a certain way of life that represents the
countryside as a rich environment that is able to sustain a
diversity of livelihoods. According to the latter argument,
the establishment of an entrepreneurial family farming sector
is crucial for rural development as it strengthens the social fab-
ric in the countryside. Nevertheless, More Food is also
accused of promoting the use of technology in ways that pri-
marily favor the industry’s own agenda; compromising the
sustainability of family farming livelihoods by exacerbating
dependency on large agricultural corporations; and increasing
levels of indebtedness. To fully appreciate where these perspec-
tives originate from it is necessary to consider the origins of
Brazil’s family farming concept and the multiple meanings
that have been ascribed to it over time.
(a) Narratives of family farming
The origins of the family farming concept are, according to
some commentators (e.g., Abramovay & Veiga, 1999;
Guanziroli, 2014; Wanderley, 2014), associated with a study
on Brazil’s agricultural policy conducted in the mid-1990s
(INCRA & FAO, 1994) that undertook a comprehensive anal-
ysis of the sector’s history since the military dictatorship and
described a process that became known as ‘‘conservative mod-
ernization”. It recounts how, during the modernization period,
from the early 1970s till the early 1990s, agricultural produc-
tion increased signiﬁcantly and the food supply crisis was
addressed without having to undertake agrarian reform; but
also argues that the policies adopted paradoxically exacer-
bated land concentration and migration to urban areas. The
study concludes, however, that after two decades of modern-
ization, and despite the high degree of land concentration,
there emerged a signiﬁcant group of small agricultural produc-
tion units whose performance was similar to that of large
farms, the fact that the former had not been the target of credit
programs or technological innovation notwithstanding
(Delgado, 2012; INCRA, 1994; Leite & Wesz Jn, 2014).
In addition to emphasizing policy imbalances, the study also
highlights the diversity of the sector, a ﬁnding corroborated by
more recent research (Medina, Almeida, Novaes, Godar, &
Pokorny, 2015). According to the criteria adopted, 85% of the
4.8 million agricultural units in Brazil could be described as
family-based, accounting for 76% of the agriculture labor force,
but only occupying 30% of farmland, and contributing just 38%
of the total value of national production (Guanziroli, Buainain,
& Sabbato, 2013). Within this group, a subset of about 400,000
units had income levels similar to those of large-scale agribusi-
nesses, which is described as ‘‘consolidated family farming”;
there were about two million agricultural units with very low
incomes, referred to as ‘‘peripheral farming”; and there was an
intermediary subset of 2.4million units labeled ‘‘transition fam-
ily farming”. The latter was the target of a raft of public policies
that aimed to increase its productivity and contribution to the
economy through a process of modernization (Guanziroli,
Buainain, & Sabbato, 2013). Established in 1995, PRONAF
was the ﬁrst credit program with such a purpose, and a year
later, the MDA was created with a mandate to support this
diverse family farming population (MDA, 1999).
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tinct categories rather than just the two indicated by the dual-
ism construct. Indeed, family farming is itself a highly
heterogeneous aggregation of farmers (Graeub et al., in
press; Medina et al., 2015), each category reﬂecting particular
socioeconomic characteristics and relationships with the mar-
ket and state, and, therefore, diﬀerent opportunities and inter-
ests (Medina et al., 2015; Schneider & Cassol, 2014). It is such
a fragmented political structure that feeds into the debate
around family farming in Brazil—and a similar argument
could be made about land reform, a highly contentious agri-
cultural policy area in its own right (Wolford, 2007, 2010).
With our focus on family farming and its dialectical rela-
tionship with agribusiness, we now turn to distinct narratives
in use. Although we argue that, in broad terms, these narra-
tives reﬂect dominant positions in Brazil’s agrarian politics,
we should make the proviso that they are stylized storylines
that inevitably simplify a complex reality.
One narrative suggests there is only one manifestation of
agriculture or that all farming is agribusiness. Those who
advocate this view refute subdivisions within the agribusiness
sector (Presideˆncia da Repu´blica, 2011; Rodrigues, 2010), or
regard the ostensible family farming–agribusiness dichotomy
as politically-motivated rhetoric (Buainain, Alves, da
Silveira, & Navarro, 2013; Navarro & Pedroso, 2011). Aside
from the scale and level of capitalization, there is, they argue,
no fundamental diﬀerence between the modern family
farmer—established or transitional—and the large producer;
the existence of diﬀerentiated policies (such as PRONAF)
and institutional spaces (such as MDA) for family farming is
therefore regarded as unnecessary, and the disappearance of
a large proportion of low-income family farmers seen as inevi-
table (Alves & Rocha, 2010; Buainain et al., 2013; Navarro,
2010).
Business leaders who perceive themselves to be the modern
entrepreneurs of the rural sphere, and are represented by
groups such as the Rural Brazilian Society and National Agri-
cultural Confederation (CNA), subscribe to this view. It is one
that is also conveyed by MAPA at ministerial level and the
Bancada Ruralista, a political lobby group, in the National
Congress. This sector comprises not only large- and small-
scale producers from the South, Southeast. and Cerrado, but
also established landowners in the northeastern semi-arid
region and agricultural frontier on the fringes of the Amazon
biome.
An opposing narrative asserts that there is an economic and
ideological opposition between family farming and agribusi-
ness, and calls for the former to be accorded an identity of
its own (Contag, 2014). This narrative was established during
the 1990s and promoted by certain rural social movements
(Favareto, 2006) that were mostly organized by unions con-
nected to the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers
(CONTAG), and, subsequently, the Family Farming Workers
Federation (FETRAF). This narrative ﬁnds expression at state
level inside the MDA.
The concept of family farming adopted by the MDA,
CONTAG, FETRAF, and other social movements encom-
passes all family producers from established to transitory
and peripheral, in spite of their very diﬀerent social posi-
tions and socio-economic statuses. Such indiscrimination
also leads to some ambiguity in the discourses of social
movements, whereby alternative conceptualizations—e.g.,
those encapsulated by the terms ‘‘food sovereignty” or ‘‘ag
roecology”—cannot not necessarily be applied to those fam-
ily farmers who are well integrated into the global market
and/or adopt modern, high-input technologies, includingthe use of sophisticated machinery and cultivation of
genetically-modiﬁed crops.
Geographically, this narrative represents small-scale farmers
in the South of the country, and similar poor producers in the
northeastern and Amazon regions. However, again, there is a
problematic relationship between this narrative and the more
capitalized small-scale producers in the South, Southeast,
and Cerrado, as although often regarded as aligned with
agribusiness, they are nonetheless represented by social move-
ments as family-based producers.
From the end of the 1990s, and especially during the 2000s,
another narrative emerged, which we refer to as ‘‘peasant fam-
ily farming”. This storyline combines environmental concerns
with the historical claim of the necessity to radical transform
Brazil’s agrarian structure (Peterson, 2009). At its core is a cri-
tique of the capitalist nature of modern agriculture, and it thus
confronts family farmers who operate in the market and
employ modern technology. More recently, this narrative
has incorporated issues such as agroecology and food sover-
eignty (Stedile & de Carvalho, 2010).
This narrative is promoted by the Landless Rural Workers’
Movement (MST) and its global network La Via Campesina 6;
it is also espoused by a range of non-governmental organiza-
tions that support agroecology. Compared to the ideologies
of other rural social movements, its proponents are less
ambiguous in relation to topics such as food sovereignty,
which they actively promote, and technological modernization
and market integration, which they condemn. At state level,
although the MDA agency INCRA (Instituto Nacional de Col-
onizac¸a˜o e Reforma Agra´ria: National Institute for Coloniza-
tion and Agrarian Reform) is the government institution
most closely aligned with the MST, this narrative has been
adopted by a range of MDA leaders and bureaucrats who
see in the positioning of La Via Campesina an alternative that
suits their opposition to agribusiness.
The main social base of the peasant family farming narrative
comprises poor farmers at the peripheral fringe and, to some
extent, some of those located in the transitional group—indi-
viduals drawn from among poor farmers in the South, and
the Amazon and northeastern semi-arid regions, as well as
other areas throughout the country; landless farmers; and
those dispossessed of land by conservative modernization.
All other family-based producers are regarded as the small-
scale expression of the model represented by agribusiness.
(b) Narratives of the More Food Program
Each of the narratives of agriculture and family farming dis-
cussed in the last section—with its particular historical origin,
core rural constituency, interest groups, and geographic loca-
tion—is reﬂected in Brazil’s national agricultural programs.
We now focus on the narratives of the More Food Program
as a means of unveiling the diﬀerent interests, beliefs, and ide-
ologies it replicate domestically as well as abroad.
Alongside elements of the family farming narrative, the ‘‘all
farming is agribusiness” narrative emphasizes ‘‘productivist
modernization” as synonym for agricultural prosperity.
Increases in productivity facilitated by modern inputs and
machinery, associated with market integration, are the best
ways to increase farmers’ income and wealth; from this per-
spective, the More Food Program is held to be an important
policy instrument (Agro Analysis, 2009).
By contrast, some proponents of the family farming narra-
tive who more actively oppose agribusiness argue against
productivity-focused modernization and call for a ‘‘territories
of life” approach (CUT, 2008). Here, the emphasis is on
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native lands, thus avoiding a rural exodus and dismantling
of the social fabric. According to this storyline, the More
Food Programme oﬀers an opportunity to unlock the diversi-
ﬁcation potential of family farming. Although such a narrative
is hostile toward the technological package ﬁnanced by the
program and its relationships with large corporations, it
emphasizes the alternatives stressed by the program’s broader
policy advocacy. The More Food Program is more ﬁercely
criticized by proponents of the ‘‘peasant family farming” nar-
rative, who argue that the program serves the interests of large
capitalistic corporations and is therefore a vehicle of conserva-
tive modernization (Ibase, 2006; Sa´, 2012; Teixeira, 2013).
These narratives thus highlight the contentious nature of the
More Food Program: rooted in ideological and class struggles,
diﬀerent groups see it in diﬀerent ways, and this, in turn,
reﬂects wider historical debates in Brazil (Wolford, 2005).
Indeed, the More Food Program itself was born out of a com-
mitment by the state to invest countercyclically at a time of
economic crisis, and of serious disputes in the agriculture sec-
tor (Patriota & Pierri, 2013). The political coalition headed by
Lula da Silva and, subsequently, by Dilma Rousseﬀ was
backed by Brazil’s industrial entrepreneurs who beneﬁted
from the state’s developmental programs in the second half
of the 2000s; the More Food Program thus allowed the
MDA to gain support from this coalition through its commit-
ment to purchase tractors and other farm equipment, and so
to increase its budget signiﬁcantly and gain inﬂuence within
the Cabinet.
Yet, our research suggests that within the MDA itself, there
was no uniform position on the aims of the More Food Pro-
gram. Some bureaucrats rejected the conservative moderniza-
tion critique and emphasized how the program made it
possible for farmers to increase their incomes, thereby combin-
ing territories of life and productivist modernization narra-
tives. At the same time, the mercantile nature of the
program was justiﬁed on the grounds that it strengthened
the national economy and promoted the export of Brazilian
technology, thus facilitating an increase in the MDA budget. 7
However, other oﬃcers argued that the subjects of the various
narratives were all farmers and that modernization was the
only way to move forward with rural development. 8 Finally,
there were those who regarded the More Food Program as a
tactical opportunity to increase resources and gain political
space for family farming in its opposition to agribusiness. 9
Overall, the MDA’s fragmented positioning reﬂects a
heterogeneous political environment in which the ministry as
an institution must respond to diﬀerent agendas, including
alignment with industry if it is to push forward its political
agenda. Thus, given the complex contours of the domestic
political economy that has framed Brazil’s More Food Pro-
gram, the question arises as to how the implementation of
the program’s international version is shaped in Africa.5. HOW NARRATIVES GET RECONFIGURED WHEN
THEY TRAVEL TO AFRICA: INSIGHTS FROM GHA-
NA, MOZAMBIQUE, AND ZIMBABWE
In this section, we focus on how narratives are transformed
when they are exported to the African context. First, we con-
sider Brazilian narratives of the MFI program, and then ana-
lyze how the program and its storylines have been received in
Africa and the repercussions of its implementation on the con-
tinent.(a) What narratives does Brazil export to Africa?
The Brazilian government’s portrayal of MFI typically
highlights its contribution to the strengthening of family farm-
ing production and food security through increases in produc-
tivity supported by appropriate Brazilian technology. For
example:
The program’s objective is to establish a line of technical cooperation
that highlights food production by family farmers as a way towards food
and nutrition security in participating countries. Alongside technical
cooperation, the intervention includes ﬁnancing of technology adapted
to the socio-environmental conditions of local family farming, as a way
of increasing production and productivity of rural units.
[MDA, 2012]
Brazilian MFI inputs include agricultural machinery and
implements sold through export credit, as well as expertise
passed on through technical cooperation activities and policy
dialog. However, the importance attributed to each of these
channels is variable, which points to contrasting expectations
about the program and its underlying aims. Actors’ accounts
are illustrative of these disparities; the starkest contrast being
between those that emphasize the program’s business dimen-
sion—in terms of opportunities created for trade and Brazilian
industry—and those that stress the political agenda of
strengthening family farming. We elaborate on each of these
below, while considering some nuances and variations.
(i) A business agenda
Since its inauguration, MFI has been talked about mainly as
a sales operation, the hardware component standing out in
most public pronouncements, including government news
releases (MDA, 2014a, 2014b, 2015b; Valor Econoˆmico,
2013). Indeed, even early descriptions of the program suggest
the importance of the business agenda:
With the increase in productivity, and consequently, income, they will be-
come regular clients of Brazilian agriculture technology.
[MDA, 2012]
This is the view expressed by Brazilian industry, which
regards sub-Saharan Africa as an important market to be
opened up (MDIC, 2013), and by trade promotion agencies,
which look to diversify the composition of Brazilian
exports. 10 Yet, it is also a view shared by some inside the
MDA, one senior bureaucrat asserting bluntly that the min-
istry’s technical cooperation policy in eﬀect comprises ‘‘a com-
mercial agenda [that aimed to establish Brazil as an
international] reference in exporting agricultural technology
and not just soybeans” 11; a point of view that had already
been publicly announced:
The program is consolidating itself as a policy for the export of machin-
ery and for contributing to food production, especially in African coun-
tries. We are exporting to Africa agricultural technology produced in
Brazil.
[MFI coordinator cited in MDA, 2014](ii) Business with a legacy
MFI is, however, not regarded as a conventional export
operation; rather, it is portrayed as an example of Brazil’s
responsible approach to business and African development,
which gives Brazilian exports a comparative edge vis-a`-vis
more ruthless competitors such as China. 12 Post-sales sup-
port 13 and technical cooperation are the extras that the pro-
gram oﬀers to clients, and these are regarded as a
contribution to Africa’s development process. An industry
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with a legacy” perspective:
Can we think of Africa as a place from which to extract advantages, or
suck advantages from? No. Africa is a place for you to make an invest-
ment from A to Z: it is about training labor, including an African labor
force, in projects, preparing Africans for growth. There is no point in hav-
ing that old perspective of ‘‘let’s take advantage”, or, in my case, ‘‘let’s
sell the machinery and run away.” That does not exist anymore. If some-
one still thinks like that, such a person is slightly, well, signiﬁcantly, out-
of-date. In reality, our business model entails a lot of training of locals, a
lot of knowledge transfer, know-how transmission. . . It is about helping
them to organize themselves and develop in a correct manner.
[Brazilian industry respondent 1, July 2014]
This perspective resonates with President Rousseﬀ’s prag-
matic view on development cooperation, which emphasizes
commercial and investment opportunities for Brazilian enter-
prises while urging them to leave a legacy to Africans through
the transfer of technology, training, and social programs
(Valor Econoˆmico, 2011).
(iii) Political advocacy
The view that MDA technical cooperation represents a com-
mercial agenda—even if with a social conscience—is not
widely shared within the ministry. In fact, the idea that the
main focus of the program is business oriented is ﬁrmly
refuted by those who argue that the MDA’s relation with
Africa is ‘‘an entirely political agenda.” 14 The latter strategy
is geared toward helping Africa build a development trajectory
centered on the notion of family farming similar to Brazil’s
own experience through the establishment of an institutional
framework for family farming, and the strengthening of state
institutions and public policies that support such a framework.
Some research participants regarded the agenda as the expres-
sion of a counter-hegemonic movement against a neoliberal
rationale that is seen as favoring agribusiness, that is, large-
scale production that mainly targets export markets. Rather,
it was regarded as supportive of a ‘‘logic of income distribu-
tion, public policy, and aﬃrmation of the role of the state,”
which, it was argued, promoted food production and was
mainly oriented toward the domestic market. 15
This political advocacy perspective puts the emphasis on the
MFI policy dialog component, which is expected to be carried
out through interaction with local counterparts as part of the
technical missions implemented in partner countries. Accord-
ingly, the sales component is regarded as compatible with this
model and portrayed as instrumental to the reproduction of
family farming, which reﬂects the position of compromise that
is most typical of the MDA, given the heterogeneous nature of
its target population. However, our research suggests there are
subtle variations to this type of positioning. Some interviewees
spoke of mechanization as part of a process of agricultural
modernization that could make farms more productive and
commercially viable, whereas others regarded it as an eﬀort
to reduce drudgery and retain people in rural areas. These
two perspectives echo the contrast between productivist mod-
ernization and territories of life narratives.
(iv) Raising productivity and creating new commercial possibil-
ities
The productivist modernization narrative is present in argu-
ments that emphasize the productivity gains and commercial
possibilities of mechanization. The types of agricultural
machinery and implements made available through MFI are,
in principle, the same as those utilized in Brazil’s domestic
More Food Program. 16 As such, they consist of equipment
suited to the characteristics of Brazilian family farms, andencompassing about 4,500 diﬀerent items including plowing,
harvesting, and transportation machinery, the utilization of
which is thought to be suﬃcient to respond to the technolog-
ical needs of farmers in target countries and raise their produc-
tivity.
In addition to increasing output, such mechanization is also
expected to open up new commercial possibilities to target
farmers, as one Brazilian industry representative exempliﬁed:
Mechanization will generate, let’s say, much greater production. Techni-
cal assistance itself will also help production. And then you will have a
situation that oﬀers options: ‘‘Well, what are we going to do? Are we
going to export this as a commodity or are we going to process it within
the country? How do we guarantee a market? Am I going to produce or-
anges and sell them at a local market, or am I also going to make juice?
Shall I do jam or only sell at the market? Shall I export my grain or pro-
cess it?”
[Brazilian industry respondent 1, July 2014](v) Mechanization as a means of reducing the drudgery of farm-
ing and keeping people in rural areas
Moreover, and echoing the territories of life perspective,
mechanization is also regarded as a means of reducing drud-
gery and oﬀering the younger generation an incentive to
remain on the land by turning farming into a more digniﬁed
activity:
Let’s take the business of machinery, that is, the More Food Program. I
had the chance of participating in debates several years ago when the pro-
gram was set up. . . and I went to several regions to talk to people about
what they thought about it, especially the tractors, where there is some
criticism. . . The most common answer I got and the one that impressed
me the most was that it served several purposes, but the most important
[from a parent’s perspective] was that it oﬀered the possibility that their
children would remain in the activity, for two main reasons. First, the
[eradication of the] hardship of farm labor. . .and, second, social recogni-
tion. Hard work is [regarded as] a poor person’s job; it is a job for people
with no brain.
[MDA respondent 5, November 2013]
Family farming is therefore portrayed not only as a partic-
ular means of production but also as a way of life 17; and
mechanization plays a social role by encouraging young peo-
ple to stay in rural areas by allowing them to pursue a digni-
ﬁed livelihood.
So how are Brazil’s disparate MFI narratives received in
Ghana, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe? Which ones are
embraced by local dynamics and which get lost in translation?
(b) What policy elements do African governments import and
why?
By early 2015, MFI was at diﬀerent stages of implementa-
tion across the three case-study countries, and the hardware
component dominated local headlines, which dwelt solely on
tractors and other agricultural equipment (Ghana News
Agency, 2012; Notı´cias online, 2015; The Herald, 2013). Zim-
babwe was at the most advanced stage, having begun to
receive equipment, although it had yet to be distributed to
farmers (Mukwereza, 2015); Mozambique came next, with
the ﬁrst batch of equipment already on its way (MDA,
2015a); and, lastly, Ghana was still at the stage of equipment
selection. 18 In terms of the non-hardware component,
Mozambique was in receipt of special attention from the
MDA, with an ongoing discussion on the Brazil side as to
how technical assistance activities should be restructured. 19
We now present a detailed analysis of these patterns with
regard to each case, followed by discussion of target-country
government’s motivation.
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policy whereby the state assumes a central role in procuring
and subsidizing technology (Diao, Cossar, Houssou, &
Kolavalli, 2014). This strategy led to the establishment of
the Agricultural Mechanization Service Center (AMSEC) pro-
gram, which promotes the development of private mechaniza-
tion centers that hire out tractors and other equipment to
farmers. The program is premised on a modernization agenda
that aims to replace outmoded shifting agriculture with mod-
ern agricultural practices based on permanent cultivation and
the use of up-to-date inputs and machinery. The Ghanaian
government regards low productivity and low technological
uptake as the result of the limited availability and high cost
of machinery—constraints that the mechanization policy aims
to address (Amanor, 2015).
Against this background, the Ghanaian government expects
MFI to supply tractors and other equipment to AMSECs in
line with its mechanization strategy, and in addition to other
ongoing agricultural machinery funding programs—notably,
that implemented by India (Diao et al., 2014). MFI is there-
fore understood as another aid-funded technology transfer
intervention and not as a special program designed to promote
agricultural cooperation between Ghana and Brazil. Indeed,
no interdepartmental linkages between the Brazilian MDA
and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture of Ghana (MoFA)
have been developed in order to deliberate either on the rele-
vance of the Brazilian experience to the Ghanaian context or
on previous experiences of mechanization programs in
Ghana. 20 Moreover, those responsible for drawing up MFI
at the MoFA were not even made aware of the domestic
Brazilian version of the program or its family farming policy
framework, but were, rather, presented with a list of Brazilian
equipment to draw from to supply the AMSECs. 21
Ghana’s list of requested items is dominated by tractors and
tractor implements (ABIMAQ, 2014), the suitability of which
for the conditions of the average Ghanaian farmer has been
questioned (Amanor, 2013a; Benin, 2014). For example, the
advantages and disadvantages of tractor technology in rela-
tion to local factors such as minimum-tillage have not been
examined. Yet, the EMBRAPA Ghana representative had
advised the Ghanaian government to pursue an agricultural
conservation strategy that included no-tillage farming and
equipment such as the Brazilian manual jab planter known
in Portuguese as matraca. 22 However, the Government of
Ghana largely ignored this advice, choosing to adopt the tech-
nology modernization approach oﬀered by the MDA through
MFI.
The tendency for case-study African governments to request
tractors and other relatively sophisticated equipment was
noted by some MDA oﬃcials as something they sought to dis-
courage, as this type of equipment (e.g., the hydraulic excava-
tors demanded by the Mozambican government 23) was
considered less suitable for the small- to medium-scale farmers
that the program was designed to target. Yet, since the Brazil-
ian government was committed to non-interference and
demand-driven cooperation principles in South–South rela-
tions (Abreu, 2013), program implementers could not reject
(only discourage) partner countries’ requests. 24
In Mozambique, one Ministry of Agriculture respondent
who worked on MFI implementation articulated the following
vision of Brazilian cooperation:
What we have been witnessing regarding Brazil’s development is very
interesting. I think Brazil has increased its production signiﬁcantly in
the last 10 years: it has transformed its family farmers almost into com-
mercial farmers. We want to beneﬁt from that experience.
[Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture respondent, March 2015]With the Mozambican government’s committed to the
expansion of large-scale commercial farming, and Brazil’s
involvement in this goal through the ProSAVANA program
(Shankland & Gonc¸alves, 2016), local government oﬃcials
do not diﬀerentiate between MFI and other Brazilian initia-
tives. It is the much-hailed agribusiness success of the Cerrado
(The Economist, 2010) and EMBRAPA technology that are
well-known and have been suggested as models for African
savannah development (Morris, Binswanger-Mkhize, &
Byerlee, 2009), while the nuances and complexities of Brazil’s
own family farming debate are not appreciated. Mechaniza-
tion and technology transfer are therefore seen in a diﬀerent
light to that perceived by the family farming advocates at
the MDA.
Rural social movements and civil society organizations in
Mozambique, together with their Brazilian peers and interna-
tional networks, have reacted against the stance of the
Mozambican government, as reﬂected by the demonstrations
against ProSAVANA (Shankland et al., 2016). These groups
accuse the program of being the largest land grab in Africa
(Wise, 2015) and a business plan for corporate takeover of
agriculture (JA!, 2013), calling instead for a peasant family
farming alternative based on food sovereignty and agroecol-
ogy ideals (JA!, 2013; UNAC, 2012). Although there has not
been similar mobilization against MFI, both Mozambican
and Brazilian civil society actors are critical of what they con-
sider to be a conservative modernization bias to the program.
Finally, in Zimbabwe, government oﬃcials also interpret
MFI as essentially a contribution to the government’s mecha-
nization policy, whereby machinery and implements can be
deployed for food production but also for cash crops. In terms
of the non-hardware component, while senior oﬃcials
involved in MFI negotiations are aware that it relates to a pol-
icy dialog on the promotion of family farming, middle-level
and frontline extension staﬀ in relevant departments of the
Ministry of Agriculture only know about the equipment. 25
While apparently removed from the political thrust of the
More Food Program with regard to family farming in Brazil,
MFI retains a degree of political signiﬁcance in Zimbabwe.
The country’s land reform is seen by some at the MDA as a
process to be supported and from which Brazil can learn
(The Herald, 2011). 26 The politics of international aid rela-
tions also matter to both sides. On the one hand, the Zimbab-
wean government gives special signiﬁcance to Brazilian
cooperation in coming to its rescue when traditional donors
isolated the country through sanctions, amid spirited lobbying
for other countries to do the same, following the 2000 land
reform (Mukwereza, 2015). It thus regards Brazil’s support
as an endorsement of this policy, as new equipment will also
beneﬁt population resettlement. On the other hand, for Bra-
zil’s part, cooperation with Zimbabwe feeds into the South–
South solidarity discourse whereby it is helping out when
Northern donors have abandoned the country. Brazil’s gesture
in selecting Zimbabwe to be among the ﬁrst beneﬁciaries of the
program is also viewed as an aﬃrmation of the country’s pol-
icy of non-interference in the politics of sovereign countries.
Overall, across the three case-study countries, MFI appears
largely stripped of the political symbolism it holds at home,
where it is regarded as the outcome of a social struggle for
political recognition of family farming. This symbolism melts
away when the program materializes in Africa as an instru-
ment of mechanization, or of aid politics. The nuances
between diﬀerent types of family farming associated with dif-
ferent constituencies in various parts of Brazil and the struggle
for recognition by each are dissolved once the program
reaches Africa. Rather, MFI is embraced as an opportunity
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nues for the sector. This reﬂects the interests of the political
elite in each country respectively, who have naturally taken
the leads in negotiating deals.
In Ghana, the hardware component of MFI not only
accords with the government’s technology modernization nar-
rative but also serves the alliance between government and
international agribusiness (Amanor, 2013b). Moreover, trac-
tors and other hardware provide opportunities for political
patronage (Ghana News Agency, 2009).
In Mozambique, social mobilization notwithstanding, the
political elite retains a strong commitment to external invest-
ment in land and agriculture, as witnessed by ProSAVANA
and other initiatives (Clements & Fernandes, 2013; Garcia,
Kato, & Fontes, 2013). Additional equipment for the modern-
ization of the agriculture sector also suits the country’s agrar-
ian elite, who are closely allied to core political constituencies
(do Rosa´rio, 2012; Hall & Paradza, 2012).
In Zimbabwe, the government is keen to secure support for
land reform, but commercial banks have not provided any
meaningful backing in the face of a liquidity crunch that has per-
sisted since the economy’s dollarization in 2009. In any case,
with all entitlement to landnowvested in the state and real estate
ceasing to be an acceptable formof collateral, commercial banks
have been reluctant to lend to new farmers, particularly in
respect of capital to purchase equipment that has to be repaid
over time. Furthermore, in the absence of any public statement
on the subject since the ﬁrst tranche of Brazilian equipment
arrived at the end of 2014, rumors are rife that it will be dis-
tributed along partisan lines (Mugabe, 2015; NewsDay, 2015).
Owing to this conﬁguration of interests in the three case-
study countries, ideas formulated in Brazil—e.g., replication
of advances in the domestic family farming model, reduction
of farm-work drudgery, retention of people in rural areas,
etc.—have had little resonance. However, the questions of
the eﬀect of MFI on those on the Brazilian side who have
engaged with the program on a political-ideological basis,
and the nature of feedback loops generated by the reception
that MFI has had in Africa remain to be answered. Develop-
ments identiﬁed in respect of the program in Mozambique
oﬀer evidence of the response that is taking shape, and concern
a reframing of the MFI technical assistance element that we
interpret as an attempt to reinstate the program’s family farm-
ing advocacy thrust.
(c) Feedback loops: a Mozambique story
Having cleared the way for implementation of the hardware
component, the MDA’s international relations team focused
on revisiting the technical assistance—or non-hardware—
component of MFI. 27However, until early 2015, this was only
evident in respect ofMozambique. Changes envisaged included
giving MFI a more explicit focus on technical assistance and
rural extension (known in Brazil asAssisteˆncia Te´cnica e Exten-
sa˜o Rural: ATER), targeting family farmers, and connecting the
intervention to other ongoing cooperation initiatives in the
country with the same target group, notably the Food Purchase
Program for Africa (Programa de Aquisic¸a˜o de Alimentos-
A´frica: PAA-Africa) and a school feeding program 28; both
agricultural cooperation initiatives were endorsed by Brazilian
socialmovements. 29TheMDA team responsible for the adjust-
ment expected the addition of an ATER element to improve
coherence and eﬀectiveness across Brazilian cooperation initia-
tives targeting family farming inMozambique, and bring devel-
opments to the agriculturemodelmore in linewith the territories
of life narrative. 30However, harmonization with the hardware component
could not be guaranteed, as there was no mechanism in place
to ensure that farmers accessing MFI-provided machinery
would be the same as those targeted by other Brazilian coop-
eration initiatives. Our interviews with MDA oﬃcials suggest
indeed a growing breach between the program’s hardware and
non-hardware elements. The former appeared to have gained a
life of its own and was now in the hands of implementers at
MDA and the countries’ authorities. One MDA respondent
even expressed embarrassment at the course followed, and
the fact that the program had become exclusively associated
with the selling of machinery.
We are discussing how to mobilize them [the Mozambican Ministry of
Education] as partners in the ATER proposal that we are putting to-
gether, as I guess [anonymous informant] has told you. [Interviewer: Con-
cerning More Food International?] Yes, it is about More Food, but we do
not like to refer to it in that way because we feel embarrassed about
More Food. [Interviewer: is that because of the association with the sale
of tractors?] Yes.
[MDA respondent 9, July 2014]
The choice of Mozambique as the target of these adjust-
ments to MFI should be assessed in the light of other develop-
ments in Brazil’s cooperation portfolio in the country. First,
Mozambique is a special given case given that it receives the
largest proportion of Brazil’s overseas agricultural aid and
investment (Cabral et al., 2013). Second, the high-proﬁle Pro-
SAVANA program has garnered much negative publicity and
mobilized public opinion against it, a position that has been
exacerbated through the connection of local civil society orga-
nizations with anti-land grab- and agroecology-friendly inter-
national networks (Shankland & Gonc¸alves, 2016). This
situation has impacted on debates around agricultural cooper-
ation within the Brazilian government—criticism that has
been replicated within the MDA—and ProSAVANA has been
described as a ‘‘model not to be followed,” and ‘‘contrary to
the interests of family farming.” 31 The MDA is therefore
eager to reinstate its credentials as the champion of family
farming, and distance itself from ProSAVANA and the criti-
cism that the former also serves a business agenda.
Nevertheless, although not oﬃcially articulated, the refram-
ing of MFI in the personal accounts of MDA actors as a bi-
modal hardware/non-hardware initiative suggests an internal
reaction not only against the program’s business motivations
but also against agricultural modernization. While this may
not sit easily with Brazil’s foreign policy objectives, which Pro-
SAVANA serves more neatly given its focus on providing a
platform for Brazilian agribusiness companies and
EMBRAPA technology, it is a movement supported by recent
developments at the international level with which Brazil has
been associated. The current Brazilian director general of the
FAO is highly supportive of PAA-Africa and the family farm-
ing model in general, and has called for a ‘‘paradigm shift” in
agriculture such that agroecology is seen as a means of moving
food production onto a more sustainable footing (UN News
Centre, 2015).6. CONCLUSION
The Brazilian government’s narrative on the suitability of its
technology and policy experiments in Africa is premised on a
claim of aﬃnity between the two contexts (Scoones et al.,
2016). Yet, policy concepts and ideas that emerge in particular
settings, such as family farming in Brazil, do not travel easily
across space and socio-political realities, and must be histori-
cally and geographically contextualized. This study sought to
56 WORLD DEVELOPMENTdo this by analyzing: (a) the genesis of Brazil’s family farming
concept and its distinct formulations; (b) the various interpre-
tations by Brazilian actors of the More Food Program and its
international version, MFI; and (c) the reception and reconﬁg-
uration of MFI in three African countries.
First, our examination of Brazilian actors’ narratives
pointed to the contentious nature of family farming, which
can best be understood as a ‘‘ﬂoating signiﬁer” whose multiple
meanings mirror Brazil’s historical sociopolitical struggle and
complex agricultural system—both of which have been shaped
by institutional politics, class dynamics, and geography. This
indicates that Brazil’s domestic agrarian politics is more com-
plex than a simple family farming–agribusiness dualism fram-
ing suggests, as family farming is itself a disputed concept.
Second, the transfer of the More Food Program to Africa
should be considered within the framework of Brazil’s overall
development cooperation, the channel for policy transfer.
Indeed, we found that the implementation of MFI not only
reﬂected Brazil’s complex agrarian politics but was also inte-
grated into its foreign policy, in which business and diplomatic
imperatives also played a role. This conﬂuence of diﬀerent
agendas generated MFI’s hybrid form, whereby tractors and
other equipment sold on concessional terms served the export
industry, and the non-hardware component assumed the role
of a political advocacy impetus that was exploited by the
Brazilian state as well as various social movements.
Third, understandably, the convergence of these diﬀerent
interests and perspectives was not free of tension. Rather,
MFI was revealed as an arena in which Brazilian actors repli-
cated abroad the battles they fought at home. Yet, unlike the
high-proﬁle clash that erupted with ProSAVANA in Mozam-
bique, disputes concerningMFIand family farmingwere largely
concealed. Indeed, rather than argumentative confrontations in
the public sphere, they remained discursive battles for meaning
played out behind the scenes and revealed to us through the dis-
parate ways in whichMFI and family farming were articulated.
Fourth, the diﬀerent understandings of family farming
exported by Brazilian actors through MFI gained new inter-
pretation upon reaching Africa, where recipient governments
developed their own views on the program and this mode of
agriculture. The coincidence of interests between African
political and bureaucratic elites and the Brazilian hardware
exporters was visible in all three case-study countries. This ties
in with the wider push for the technology-intensive Green
Revolution and development of large-scale commercial agri-
culture in Africa as a response to food insecurity (Africa
Progress Panel, 2014). However, such an imperative rather
leaves aside family farming advocacy, with its origins in the
Brazilian struggle for autonomous farming livelihoods as an
alternative to corporate agriculture—although the family
farming narrative is not necessarily adverse to engagement in
the export market or modern technologies.
Sometimes expressed as a ‘‘territories of life” narrative, this
position was not successfully articulated in Africa, at least, notuntil non-governmental mobilizations in Mozambique. Reac-
tion to the particular type of large-scale, corporate Brazilian
intervention implemented here mainly targeted ProSAVANA
but also had a broader impact, including that on MFI.
Although non-governmental actors generally praised the latter
for advancing the family farming narrative, they criticized its
mechanization element for reinforcing the value-chains of cor-
porate agriculture and compromising the sustainability of
family farming over the long term.
Fifth, it was in the context of such a visible dispute over
agricultural development models that the non-hardware ele-
ment of MFI was reaﬃrmed and links forged with other pro-
grams—notably PAA-Africa—as well as Brazil’s other
international initiatives, including those implemented through
the FAO. Thus, the apparent reconﬁguration of MFI in
Mozambique reﬂected not only the concerns of Mozambican
social actors regarding favored models of agricultural develop-
ment in Brazilian cooperation, but also the need—as expressed
by a coalition of Brazilian and international actors—to con-
solidate a certain understanding of family farming that had
so far gained little traction on the recipient side.
Overall, MFI, as well as Brazil’s agricultural cooperation
more broadly, can be viewed as a discursive battleﬁeld where
best models and visions of agrarian development and aid are
in dispute. Beyond the speciﬁcs of Brazil’s domestic politics
and its agricultural interventions in Africa, the MFI experi-
ence speaks to wider scholarly debates around agrarian change
that highlight the continuous class-based power struggle
between diﬀerent groups within the state as well as society at
large (Borras, 2009; Byres, 2009), together with the need to
consider the politics of knowledge (and discourse) that are
underpinned by struggles between diﬀerent framings of reality
(Scoones, 2009).
As MFI implementation in Africa continues, further
research is necessary to trace its trajectory. It will be worth
investigating, for example, whether the apparent fracturing
of the program into two separate initiatives driven by diﬀerent
agendas materializes and spreads beyond Mozambique. If
such a division were conﬁrmed, this would question the ability
of the Brazilian government to achieve a convergence of devel-
opment solidarity and business objectives in its cooperation
framework. Additionally, there is scope for a more detailed
analysis than was possible in the present paper of how African
actors perceive and draw on Brazil’s family farming experi-
ence, and how such understandings evolve over time.
Finally, the discourse-analytical approach to our study on
MFI revealed the less visible dimensions of policy transfer: the
program not only exported goals, instruments, and concepts
from Brazil to Africa, but also intrinsic struggles for meaning
that concerned, not least, family farming and the role of mech-
anization in agricultural development. Yet, questions around
the impact of MFI and the meeting of its goals in the African
context remain to be asked—bearing in mind, however, the dis-
tinct rationale ascribed to the program on this continent.NOTES1. Glynos, Howarth, Norval, and Speed (2009), Torﬁng (2005) and
Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) oﬀer overviews of diﬀerent discourse
analysis approaches and methods.
2. Government agencies interviewed in Brazil included the MDA,
Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade (MDIC), Chamber of
Commerce (CAMEX), Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Brazilian Cooperation
Agency, and Export Promotion Agency (APEX).3. In Brazil, family farmers represent a category of agricultural producers
who necessarily fulﬁll four criteria established by legislation (Law 11-
326/2006): (i) landholdings cannot be larger than four ﬁscal modules; (ii) non-
wage family labor is predominant; (iii) household income derivesmainly from
activities on the farm; and (iv) the family manages the farm. However, this
precise deﬁnition notwithstanding, it is worth noting that family farming in
not a clearly deﬁned statistical category at the global level and is therefore
subject to various interpretations across countries (Graeub et al., in press).
BRAZIL’S AGRICULTURAL POLITICS IN AFRICA 574. CAMEX respondent and MDA respondents 3 and 4, November 2013.
5. MDA respondent 4, November 2013.
6. La Via Campesina is an international peasant’s movement.
7. MDA respondents 2 and 5, November 2013.
8. MDA respondent 3, November 2013.
9. MDA respondent 1, November 2011.
10. CAMEX respondent, November 2013, and APEX respondents 1 and
2, July 2014.
11. MDA respondent 3, November 2013.
12. CAMEX respondent, November 2013, and APEX respondents 1 and
2, July 2014.
13. Repair and maintenance services guaranteed by companies selling
agricultural machinery and equipment under the program (Repu´blica
Federativa do Brasil, 2013).
14. MDA respondent 2, November 2013.
15. MDA respondent 2, November 2013. Cabral (2015) also discusses
this contention.
16. MDA respondent 3, November 2013.
17. MDA respondent 2, November 2013.
18. MDA respondents 6, 7 and 8, July 2014.19. MDA respondents 6, 7 and 8, July 2014.
20. Respondent from the Agricultural Engineering Services Directorate,
Ministry of Food and Agriculture of Ghana, July 2014.
21. Respondent from the Agricultural Engineering Services Directorate,
Ministry of Food and Agriculture of Ghana, July 2014.
22. EMBRAPA in Ghana respondents 1 and 2, March 2012 and 2013
respectively.
23. MDA respondent 3, November 2013.
24. MDA respondent 3, November 2013, and MDA respondents 6, 7 and
8, July 2014.
25. Ministry of Agriculture Zimbabwe respondent.
26. A view conﬁrmed by MDA respondent 1, November 2011.
27. MDA respondents 6, 7 and 8, July 2014.
28. Both programs draw on Brazil’s own national domestics policies on
food and nutrition security respectively. See Rocha (2009) for an analysis
of Brazil’s experience of these programs.
29. Brazilian social movement respondents 1 and 2, November 2013, and
respondent 3, December 2013. See also Schlesinger (2013).
30. MDA respondents 6, 7 and 8, July 2014.
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